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Chapter 2
The Swedish Annuity Market: Where
it is and Where it’s Headed
Edward Palmer and Bo Larsson
Economic theory predicts that rational individuals should demand annu-
ities during the dissaving phase of the life cycle (Yaari 1965), but annuity
markets in many countries are small and Sweden is no exception (Palmer
2008). Indeed, the voluntary demand for annuities in Sweden is quite
low, as in other high-income countries (Impavido et al. 2003). While
public, occupational, and private retirement schemes all provide lifelong
benefits, until recently, the scope for choice within the institutional frame-
work of the public and occupational schemes was limited by the dominance
of defined benefit (DB) arrangements. This changed dramatically in 1994,
as first the public pension scheme and then the major occupational
schemes began a transition to a defined contribution (DC) model. This
move from DB to DC personal accounts in both the public and occupa-
tional schemes has paved the way for further change, making it possible
for individuals to increasingly combine public, occupational, and private
accounts to acquire various forms of privately provided annuity products at
– and after – retirement. For this to happen, however, legislation will have
to be adopted that enables individuals to combine personal financial
accounts from public, occupational, and private FDC (funded defined
contribution) schemes, and to choose freely from a range of annuity
products tailored to suit people exiting the labor market with varying
situations and preferences.
While financial innovations in Sweden have become prevalent for private
saving efforts during the working and accumulation phase of the life cycle,
the Swedish retirement products’ marketplace looks pretty much as it did
in the 1950s. Still absent are products designed to accommodate the
varying needs associated with income support and care of the older elderly
population. The extensive Swedish safety net for the elderly is likely to
remain in place in the future, but it is unlikely that the benefits provided by
the public sector will be sufficient in scope and design to provide more
than a basic universal safety net. Given this perspective, there is room for
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product innovation in the financial market to cater to the needs of the
older population in the near future.
In what follows, we begin with an overview of the Swedish pension
landscape, followed by an analysis of the current state of demand for
annuities using a unique microeconomic database constructed for the
purposes of this study. We continue with an analysis of what is likely to
drive future demand, and we end with concluding remarks.
The Swedish pension landscape
Beginning with legislation in 1994, Sweden transformed the earnings-
related component of its public pension commitment from a DB to a DC
model. The earnings-related public benefit was transformed into a notional
defined contribution (NDC) system with a contribution rate of 16 percent,
and a funded mandatory component with a contribution rate of 2.5 per-
cent. The wage-indexed ceiling on contributory earnings for both of these
together is about twice the average wage. About 90 percent of the working
population is also covered by an occupational scheme that provides a small
supplement to the public benefit under the ceiling, and the entire benefit
above the ceiling. The move to DC in the public system spearheaded a
similar move within all four major occupational schemes. As a consequence
of these reforms, all public and practically all occupational earnings-related
benefits have now been transformed from DB to DC.
Shortly after the passage of the 1994 public system reform, the occupa-
tional scheme for blue-collar workers which covers over 40 percent of all
employees was also converted to an FDC plan. Subsequently, the same
evaluation was followed by two major public employee schemes, the local
government employee plan in 1998, and state employees in 2003 (for
coverage below the ceiling). Finally, the system covering private-sector
white-collar workers converted to the FDC system in 2007. As a result, all
occupational supplements to the public schemes are transitioning to FDC
personal account schemes.
The typical Swedish worker now contributes a total of 7 percent of
earnings to mandatory and occupational FDC schemes (2.5 and 4.5 per-
cent, respectively). In both the public and occupational schemes, the
participant’s retirement account balance is converted into an annuity. In
many cases, there is a choice between a traditional and a unit-linked
annuity. The Swedish traditional approach would pay a life annuity includ-
ing a profit-sharing arrangement, to be discussed below in more detail. A
unit-linked annuity gives a variable annuity rate based on the annual
performance of the participant’s investment portfolio, and the benefit is
recalculated annually based on the participant’s account value at the time
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of recalculation, normally using a cohort life expectancy estimate fixed at
the age of retirement.
As a result, the typical Swedish worker has considerable income protection
in old age through the combined mandatory public and occupational bene-
fits. A career worker who entered the labor force at age 20 and worked to age
65 can expect a gross replacement rate of around 65 percent, assuming real
wage growth of 2 percent and a real annual financial return of 3.5 percent
(The World Bank 2007). More generous assumptions about the financial
return, of course, yield a higher replacement rate (Palmer 2002a).
Looking ahead, it would appear that Swedes have a substantial annuity
base in the form of the mandatory public NDC scheme, plus the mandatory
and occupational FDC schemes. Accordingly, substantial financial saving is
likely to be transformed into annuities in the future, implying a large
potential for this market. In addition, there is still room at the top for
private voluntary insurance.
Demand for annuities in Sweden
Next, we analyze the present demand and market for annuities, and we
identify factors likely to determine future demand and the capacity of the
market to develop to meet this demand. As in other high-income countries,
the development of demand for voluntary annuities in Sweden has been
held back by comprehensive mandatory public and quasi-mandatory occu-
pational pensions.1 Prior to the pension reforms described above, the
prevailing belief was that the public pension replaced 65 percent of income
at age 65, and occupational pensions added an additional 10 percent. Yet
this was only true in a world with no real wage growth, since benefits in pre-
NDC Sweden were based on the average of the participant’s best fifteen
years of earnings; for most workers, this would be the final fifteen years
prior to claiming a benefit, and, with real earnings growth, this average
would be considerably below pre-retirement pay. For instance, with 2 per-
cent real growth, the actual replacement rate would be 56 percent rather
than 65 percent. With the expectation of such high income replacement
rates, the perceived need for personal saving for retirement was (and still
is) not strong.2 Furthermore, the public sector provides all medical care
and medicine in kind with only a small co-payment, along with substantial
basic home help; it also provides, if necessary, institutional care for the
disabled elderly.
Financial market events in the mid-1980s set the stage for growth in
demand for private insurance. Until that point, the Swedish financial
market was highly regulated and the return on financial saving was re-
pressed by the regulatory structure, a fact reflected in households’ financial
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portfolios. In 1980, household financial assets were comprised of currency,
deposits, and bonds (78 percent), and only 11 percent of voluntary saving
went to private pension insurance and another 9 percent to equities and
mutual funds.3 Almost thirty years later, private pension saving constituted
25 percent of total household financial assets, and equities and mutual
funds about 28 percent (in 2009). This is in part due to deregulation of the
Swedish financial market in the mid-1980s. Private companies turned to
public stock offerings to finance investments, derivatives developed, and
share prices became buoyant. At the same time, mutual funds became an
option for personal saving. Then in 1993, unit-linked insurance was intro-
duced and individual retirement saving (IRS) accounts came into being
in 1994.
These developments were important for the development of the finan-
cial market and the disposition of personal saving. In addition, three
specific events occurring around 1990 were especially important for the
growth of private voluntary insurance. The first was the beginning of the
public pension reform: the publicly provided widow’s benefit was abolished
in 1990, beginning with the cohort of women born in 1945. The effect of
this change on the insurance market was dramatic: in 1980, only about 5
percent of men and 2 percent of women aged 20–64 utilized a tax deduc-
tion for premium payments for private voluntary pension insurance. The
percentage increased gradually during the 1980s, still with a slightly larger
percentage of men than women purchasing insurance (Palmer 2002b).
With the abolition of the widow’s benefit in the public scheme, by 2008,
43 percent of women aged 20–64 claimed a deduction for premium pay-
ments for private insurance, compared with 36 percent of men (Table 2.1).
Table 2.1 Distribution of tax-deductible pension saving (2008)
Percent of population utilizing a
deduction
Average amount of deduction
(1000 kronor)
Age (year) Men Women Men Women
20–24 11.2 10.5 2.3 1.9
25–34 33.8 38.3 3.8 3.2
35–44 42.4 50.2 5.7 4.6
45–54 39.1 51.3 8.2 6.4
55–64 34.3 45.3 11.3 8.9
65þ 3.4 2.3 14.4 9.4
20–64 35.0 43.0 7.1 5.8
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Statistics Sweden (2009).
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The second important event was the introduction of unit-linked insur-
ance in 1993. Only seven years after its introduction, by the year 2000, unit-
linked insurance had grown so rapidly that the proportion of assets held by
individuals in private voluntary insurance was about equally divided be-
tween traditional and unit-linked insurance (Palmer 2002b). A third event
believed to have affected the demand for voluntary pension insurance
occurred in 1995, when the amount of the allowable tax deduction was
cut from the equivalent of $9,000 to $4,500 (US, using an exchange rate of
7.5 SEK per USD). With the change in the tax deduction, the average
nominal amount of the yearly deduction decreased from the equivalent
of $1,250 (US) in 1980 to $850 (US) in 2008 (or 6,400 SEK in Table 2.1 at
an exchange rate of 7.5 SEK per USD; Palmer 2002b).
In sum, in spite of a dramatic reduction in the allowable personal income
tax deduction for premium payments for private insurance, the share of
individual voluntary insurance in total financial assets of households was
25 percent in 2009 versus 11 percent in 1980. The demand for private
insurance has therefore increased substantially in the past three decades,
and the demand for annuities will follow in the not-so-distant future.
The current distribution of pension benefits is also an indicator of the
demand for private annuities, especially the market for voluntary pension
insurance for today’s pensioners. Table 2.2 presents data for payments of
benefits from mandatory public, quasi-mandatory occupational (contrac-
tual), and voluntary insurance purchases by age group, for the year 2008.
Generally, the data suggest that public, contractual/occupational, and
voluntary individual benefits fulfill different needs.
The first set of pensioners is a group of beneficiaries aged 55–60. Age 55
is the minimum age at which an occupational or private voluntary benefit
can be claimed in Sweden, and 61 is the minimum age to claim a public
benefit. In 2008, benefit recipients aged 55–60 constituted 6 percent of all
beneficiaries. The information on the total number of pensioners in this
age group, together with the number of persons with an occupational or
voluntary benefit, indicates that about half of those claiming a voluntary
insurance benefit are also recipients of an occupational benefit. The aver-
age occupational benefit is 53,000 SEK and the average private voluntary
benefit is 32,000 SEK. An individual with both would have about 85,000
SEK per year or 7,000 SEK per month, close to the social assistance mini-
mum. Hence, it is not likely that this benefit normally is the sole source of
income for the recipient.
A second subset is the group aged 61–64 with a relatively large occupa-
tional benefit, on average. In this age interval, people tend to have either
an occupational or a voluntary individual benefit, but seldom both. Note
also that the average public benefit among claimants in this age group is
very small, indicating that most wait until age 65 to claim a full public
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benefit. Age 65 is important in the Swedish context because, until 2001
when the right to work until age 67 was legislated, most employees were
prevented from working longer by contracts entered into by central man-
agement and labor organizations. From age 65 onward, continued employ-
ment required an agreement between the employee and the employer.
Although early retirement with a public benefit can be claimed from age
61 and workers can also continue past the age of 65, most still view age 65 as
being the ‘normal’ pension age.
Occupational benefits are used to cover early retirement from the labor
force (a) for those few occupations where early retirement is specified in
the employment contract (e.g., firemen), and (b) for persons who either
upon the initiative of the employer or by their own initiative voluntarily
choose to leave the labor force in their early 60s deferring their claim on
their public benefit until later, usually at the age of 65 (although this is in
the process of changing as more people have begun to work until 67 within
the framework of the new public system). For those who take out occupa-
tional benefits prior to the age of 65, occupational pensions are normally
actuarially adjusted from age 65 to compensate for the early retirement
payments.
The data in Table 2.2 show that the age group 65–70 constitutes a third
significant group with regard to payments from occupational and individu-
al voluntary schemes (note that the minimum pension age for the public
pension is 61, but that the normal age at which people claim a public
pension is 65, a custom established when 65 was the ‘full-benefit’ pension
age in the old system). The data suggest a clear tendency to claim both
occupational and voluntary benefits for the statutory minimum five-year
period, where permitted by the conditions of the contract.
Finally, the data in Table 2.2 also show that the percentage of benefit
recipients with a private voluntary pension declines relatively rapidly with
age. This pattern reflects two market characteristics. The first is an increas-
ing tendency for younger cohorts to purchase individual voluntary insur-
ance, which in part explains the significantly higher incidence of payments
from voluntary schemes to younger cohorts of pensioners. Secondly, how-
ever, the data can reflect preferences for five- or ten-year withdrawals to
enhance consumption during the initial period of retirement. A third
possibility is that voluntary insurance is particularly pervasive among per-
sons with short lives. This implies the possibility of adverse selection, due to
the knowledge that one will have a shorter life than normal. Nevertheless,
there is little evidence toward this: of those that had either or both of
private voluntary pension saving or occupational pension and withdrew it
at the earliest possible time (at 55 years of age), the vast majority waited
until age 65 or older to withdraw their public pensions. There were 805
people who had an opportunity to draw benefits at age 55 in 1992 and
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actually did it, but only 123 of those persons started to withdraw a public
pension at the earliest possible age of 61. Far more (491 persons) waited
until their 65th year to withdraw the public pension. Finally, although
available data are insufficient to draw a firm conclusion, the overall picture
of the distribution of claims among the age groups leads us to the tentative
conclusion that life annuities are not much more prevalent than the
approximate 7 percent figure for persons 75 and older indicates.
What about the future demand for private voluntary annuities? The age,
income, and gender distribution of tax deductions for premiums paid for
private voluntary pensions provides an indication of the trend (see Table
2.1). Whereas about 20 percent of present pensioners aged 65 or older
receive a payment from voluntary insurance, about 40 percent of the
population aged 20–64 claimed a deduction in 2008 for premiums paid
to a private voluntary plan. Whether this will lead to five- or ten-year with-
drawals or life annuities is impossible to say because Sweden presently has
no national data on the types of contracts.
The underlying data from Statistics Sweden behind Table 2.1, while not
provided here, show several dominant characteristics of persons aged 20–64
presently claiming a tax deduction for voluntary private pension or life insur-
ance. The first is that, for both men and women, the percentage claiming a
deduction increases with income. Second, the log increase in the size of
deduction is slower than the log increase in income, with an estimated elastici-
ty of 0.71. Thirdly, more women than men claim a deduction at all ages from
25 to 64. Fourthly, the average deduction of women was greater than that of
men for all income classes above the average, up to the highest income class.
The main conclusion is that 40 percent of current workers claim a
deduction for private insurance, indicating that the demand for annuities
will be higher in the future than it presently is. A second conclusion is that
the legislation abolishing the publicly provided widow’s benefit for persons
born in 1945 and later affected women’s demand for private insurance.
Indirectly, it may also have affected men’s demand for insurance including
a survivor benefit, although we have no data to verify this likely outcome.
Finally, it is important to note that the conversion from DB to DC has
probably itself influenced the demand for private individual insurance. To
the extent that the DB schemes contained some degree of implicit redistri-
bution from long- to short-career contributors, which was certainly true of
the public scheme, the general message of the transition is that for a given
contribution rate, the transition is to the advantage of persons with longer
contribution periods. A result of this change both within the public and
occupational schemes can be increased demand for private insurance from
persons with shorter earnings careers.
In many countries, the conversion to DC would be a disadvantage for
women. Generally speaking, in Sweden this is not the case. This is because
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in the public NDC and FDC schemes, periods of up to four years per child
in conjunction with the birth of a child are covered with non-contributory
rights financed externally from the state-budget. This transfer is generally
sufficient to compensate for time spent away from the labor force in
conjunction with childbirth.
For all of these reasons, in the not-so-distant future, around 40 percent of
new retirees will be in the market for privately provided retirement pro-
ducts. In theory, individuals should be especially interested in insuring
against the risk of a long life, but as we have seen, the current evidence
from Sweden is that this is not the case. Instead, voluntary insurance has
been availed, first, to enhance consumption during early retirement (for
those aged 55–64) prior to claiming a public (and supplementary occupa-
tional) benefit at age 65 or later, and, second, to supplement public and
occupational benefits primarily in the first decade of retirement, in the age
group 65–74. Only a small percentage of retirees aged 80 or older presently
have a voluntary benefit.
Determinants of the demand for voluntary
and occupational annuities
To analyze the demand for pension products, we are interested first in the
kinds of products people choose, that is, life annuities or phased with-
drawals of five or ten years (standard products in Sweden), and who
makes these withdrawals. In the absence of such straightforward informa-
tion, we have to approach the question through the back door and deduce
what people have done by using a longitudinal income database. That is
what we do in this section: we analyze the behavior of pension savers by
examining actual withdrawal patterns.
Overview of individual data
The data used come from the LISA database from Statistics Sweden which
reports comprehensive information on individuals’ income and various
individual characteristics. An overview of the withdrawal patterns for non-
public, that is, private voluntary and occupational pensions appears in
Figure 2.1. Here, it is clear that the first type of pension claimed at the
earliest possible age to claim a pension (age 55) is a pension from indivi-
duals’ own private pension saving. Since this saving is tax-deductible, this
behavior would be logical if people have a lower tax rate when they claimed
this benefit than when they paid their premiums and claimed their deduc-
tion earlier. It would also be logical for individuals who had saved some
money this way but not enough to matter in the long run to claim a short
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payout period as soon as they can. In general, this enhances consumption
at a relatively early age, but is hardly consistent with the idea that people
purchase insurance to provide for inactive years in old age.
The older the retirees, the larger the fraction that first starts drawing the
occupational pension or takes a combination of both the occupational and
private pension saving. This is due to the fact that occupational benefits
provide a means to leave the labor force partially or wholly for persons who
for one or another reason desire to do this, but are healthy and do not
qualify for disability. In a very limited number of occupations, occupational
benefits provide the normal means of exit for persons whose contractual
labor agreements require that they leave the labor force prior to age 65, which
until 1999 was the full-benefit retirement age in both the public and occu-
pational schemes. For persons desiring to retire prior to age 65, an occupa-
tional benefit was – and still is – themajor benefit workers claimed, leaving a
claim of the larger public benefit until age 65 or later. This behavior leads to
an actuarial reduction in the occupational benefit when it is converted to a
supplement to the public benefit, when the latter is claimed.
Figure 2.2 shows how the private pension is actually withdrawn by pen-
sion savers. To construct the figure, we classify the withdrawals into four
distinct categories: withdrawals of the minimum allowed duration of five
years (23.4 percent of total observations), those we can deduce have a life
annuity (21.7 percent of total observations), withdrawals that terminated
before the final year of our dataset (2007) but longer than five years (44.9
percent of total observations), and finally those that have either several
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Figure 2.1 Share of private and occupational pension for those retired in 1992.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Statistics Sweden (2009).
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insurances or individual pension saving accounts for at least five years, but
who stop and later start up payments, which we call ‘other’ (9.9 percent of
all persons). For example, this group may start with a private pension, stop
this pension then start later another private pension perhaps together with
an occupational benefit and/or a public benefit; often this latest started
private pension is not terminated before 2007, the end of our observation
period (70 percent of other are not terminated by 2007). The outcome of
this pension career would be a life annuity.
Older retirees tend to have a longer withdrawal duration, suggesting that
the aim of early withdrawals is to liquidate funds that might have been
deposited for the sole purpose of utilizing the tax-deduction. The fraction
of those withdrawing private pension saving for the minimum five years is
constant at around 20 percent, with a temporary peak at age 65.
Analysis of data
In the remainder of this section, we analyze what characterizes the choice
of withdrawal period for private pension saving. To do this, we use a
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Figure 2.2 Form of private pension withdrawal (1992). Source: Authors’ calculations
based on Statistics Sweden (2009).
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multinomial Logit model (Greene 1997). In 1992, just over 103,000 people
who did not receive any payments in 1991 started drawing a private volun-
tary, occupational, or public pension (or some combination of these).
About a quarter of these (25,942 persons) with a first-time benefit in 1992
had a private voluntary pension sometime between 1992 and 2007, and
were still alive in 2007 or died after the private pension payments were
terminated. This is the dependent variable in our analysis. With the help of
the multinominal Logit model, we examine the relative odds that an
individual who had a private voluntary benefit claimed it as a life annuity,
which is the basis for comparison, or claimed it for at least five years but less
than life (5 < x < life), five years (5), or other (described earlier).
The independent variables depicted in Table 2.3 include the worker’s
level of occupational pension (occ), level of income after starting drawing
pension (inc), level of education (edu), sex (female is coded as 1), and age
in 1992 (age) when first drawing a benefit. Dummies are used to denote
white-collar private employees (itp), municipal and county council employ-
ees (mun), blue-collar private employees (stp), and central government
employees (gov). Income variables are measured in tens of thousands of
SEK (Swedish kronor). The highest level of education attained is coded
from 1 through 6, where 1 is pre-high-school shorter than nine years, 2 is
pre-high-school equivalent to nine years, 3 refers to high-school, 4 to post
high-school education of fewer than two years, 5 is post-high-school educa-
tion longer than two years, and 6 is post-graduate education (enrolled in a
Ph.D. program).
From Table 2.3, it is evident that all variables matter for at least one of the
types of withdrawals, in terms of being significant. Judging by McFadden’s
R2, the age and age-squared terms are especially important for the model’s
overall explanatory power. We have also experimented with dropping the
dummies for four occupational pension categories, which does not have a
big effect on the model’s explanatory power, indicating that category is
much less important than age. We obtain the same outcome when we
delete the occupational benefit level. By examining alternative models,
we see that the parameter estimates are stable, as most parameters are in
the same range for all specifications with one exception (which is insignifi-
cant); parameter estimates do not change signs in the alternative specifica-
tions. The magnitude of correlation is also below 0.33 for all the included
variables and most correlations are in the range +/0.1.
To interpret Table 2.3, the coefficients show the log of the relative
probabilities with the ‘Life annuity’ as the benchmark. For example, if
the level of income provided by the occupational pension rose by SEK
10,000, this reduces the probability that an individual will choose a five-year
withdrawal period for his or her private voluntary benefit. This suggests
that either these two sorts of pension options are substitutes or that they are
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Table 2.3 Estimated multinomial model for persons of age 55–67 drawing private
voluntary benefit during some years during 1992–2007
Model:
lnðPi;j=Pi;LifeÞ ¼ bj ;0 þ bj ;Occ :occ þ bj ;inc :inc þ bj ;edu:edu þ bj ;sex :sex þ bj ;age :age
þbj ;age2 :age2 þ bj ;itp :itp þ bj ;mun:mun þ bj ;stp:stp þ bj ;gov :gov;
j ¼ f5< x <Life; 5;Otherg
Duration in years (intercept)
5 < x < Life 66.21*** 0.66*** 67.66*** 70.27***
5 102.36*** 0.40*** 102.09*** 107.89***
Other 81.03*** 1.43*** 77.90*** 81.43***
Level of occupational pension in tens of thousands SEK
5 < x < Life 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
5 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.02***
Other 0.0021 0.01** 0.0009
Level of income year after first drawing benefit
5 < x < Life 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
5 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02***
Other 0.0046** 0.01*** 0.0049** 0.0047**
Level of education, 6 levels coded, 1 for low and 6 for highest (9 for undefined)
5 < x < Life 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.04*** 0.07***
5 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.12***
Other 0.03^ 0.05** 0.06*** 0.03
Female (0 for men, 1 for women)
5 < x < Life 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.23*** 0.14***
5 0.16*** 0.14*** 0.20*** 0.20***
Other 0.10^ 0.15** 0.14** 0.11*
Age in 1992
5 < x < Life 2.21*** 2.27*** 2.34***
5 3.39*** 3.36*** 3.57***
Other 2.55*** 2.44*** 2.57***
Age in 1992 squared
5 < x < Life 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02***
5 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***
Other 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02***
Private white-collar occupational pension (dummy)
5 < x < Life 0.10** 0.12** 0.12**
5 0.02 0.01 0.01
Other 0.23*** 0.31*** 0.23***
Municipal and county council employee occupational pension (dummy)
5 < x < Life 0.29*** 0.32*** 0.30***
5 0.27*** 0.23*** 0.25***
(continued)
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largely entirely different products, purchased with different intentions.
The analysis also shows that blue-collar, municipal, county council, and
central government workers are likely to choose a minimum withdrawal
period of five years for the private voluntary benefit, whereas this variable is
insignificant for private white-collar workers. There is a similar significant
tendency for these categories of workers to take a benefit for more than five
years but less than for life, and a significant – but relatively weaker –
tendency for white-collar workers to do the same. Even if they go in the
same direction, the results are weakest for white-collar workers which
suggests a greater relative proclivity for life annuities for this group. We
also see that having higher income is associated with a smaller probability
of drawing a non-life benefit, suggesting that those who choose shorter
payouts use the money to supplement – or replace – income during the
younger years of withdrawal. In addition, the more educated are less likely
to elect both short- and intermediate-term payout schemes.
We find it surprising that women have a higher probability of selecting
non-life annuities than men, since several studies suggest that women tend
to adopt more prudent investment strategies than men in other countries
(Hinz et al. 1997; Sunde´n and Surette 1998; Agnew et al. 2003). Yet, other
Table 2.3 (Continued)
Model:
lnðPi;j=Pi;LifeÞ ¼ bj ;0 þ bj ;Occ :occ þ bj ;inc :inc þ bj ;edu :edu þ bj ;sex :sex þ bj ;age :age
þbj ;age2 :age2 þ bj ;itp :itp þ bj ;mun:mun þ bj ;stp:stp þ bj ;gov :gov;
j ¼ f5< x <Life; 5;Otherg
Other 0.32*** 0.31*** 0.31***
Private blue-collar occupational pension (dummy)
5 < x < Life 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.17**
5 0.47*** 0.45*** 0.49***
Other 0.12 0.38*** 0.13^
Central government employee occupational pension (dummy)
5 < x < Life 0.59*** 0.60*** 0.61***
5 0.37*** 0.36*** 0.33***
Other 0.21** 0.28*** 0.20**
Log-likelihood 31224 31990 31357 31288
McFadden R2 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.04
LR-test (chi-
square)
2942.6*** 1410.1*** 2677*** 2814.9***
Notes: Number of observations: 25,942. Significance levels: 0***, 0.001**, 0.01*, 0.05^. SEK refers to the
Swedish krona.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Statistics Sweden (2009).
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studies on Swedish data have shown that women are more likely to make
active investment choices in the Swedish DC scheme (Engstro¨m and Wer-
sterberg 2003), and that the gender effect appears in the context of high-
risk but not low-risk choices (Sa¨ve-So¨derberg 2009). Additionally, the youn-
gest cohort studied here is eligible for widow’s benefits, which could also
explain why this group of women is less likely not to elect the life annuity.
There is also evidence that less risk averse individuals are more likely to
have voluntary pension saving, indicating that it could be that the women
with voluntary pension saving value the longevity risk less (Larsson and
Sa¨ve-So¨derberg 2010).
To sum up, most of the evidence offered here supports a view that many
individuals opt in favor of shorter rather than full-life annuities.
The future demand for life annuities in Sweden
A recurring theme in the literature on the demand for annuities is that
most consumers tend not to purchase lifetime payout annuities, and thus
far the Swedish data concur: those aged 55–70 years tend not to buy life
annuities, perhaps because the mandatory pension system provides a con-
sumption-smoothing device that individuals consider sufficient. It also
seems that those who do purchase private insurance are not mainly consid-
ering bequests, since they use the assets to finance their own consumption
when relatively young. It may be, though we cannot verify it, that people
may not be informed about or understand the benefits of annuitization, or
may not recognize the need to save for the contingency of disability when
very old. Or maybe individuals are constrained from trading across states
because financial markets are incomplete, preventing them from creating
an optimum insurance portfolio (Impavido et al. 2003).
The literature has also emphasized that, when a choice is possible in
annuities, the price tax may be too high (e.g., Warshawsky 1998; Mitchell et
al. 2006; Brown 2007). Demand is nipped in the bud if potential annuitants
cannot expect to get their money’s worth in the marketplace. And con-
versely, we must also acknowledge that large insurance companies might
not find it profitable to provide custom-tailored individual annuities. In the
Swedish setting, seven large companies receive around 95 percent of indi-
vidual premium payments and have command over 95 percent of all the
assets of life insurance companies (Palmer 2008). Largely, the same com-
panies also manage the occupational pension schemes. The question is, to
what extent will these companies seek to develop new voluntary products
without receiving an impetus in the form of new legislation?
A dilemma confronting potential annuitants is that the ‘normal’ pension
age is too young to move all one’s money from active equity investments
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into a ‘risk free’ investment policy associated with the purchase of a market
annuity. More generally, it is often reasonable to defer annuitization until
after a decade or so from age 65; Milevsky (2001) shows that utility-max-
imizing individuals would be best off deferring the decision to annuitize
until the age of 75–80, given that they can benefit from the returns on the
alternative strategy of investing in the equity market until this age. Seen in
this perspective, it is likely rational for Swedes to contract five to ten
withdrawal plans, within the private voluntary and occupational insurance
supplements to the public mandatory scheme. This is especially true if
these withdrawal plans offer a unit-link alternative where retirees retain
command over the investment strategy. Of course, this alternative also
requires a certain degree of sophistication to steer around the backside
of market bubbles.
One might argue that the Swedish proclivity to transform saving into
consumption during the younger years of retirement is the result of a poor
understanding of what the future has in store. This is because both the
older public pay-as-you-go DB scheme and the new NDC schemes provide
price-indexed annuities; as workers experience real wage growth, the ratio
of a pension to an average wage will fall. This decline in the relative living
standard vis a´ vis contemporaneous workers becomes more marked with
increasing age. Yet, few Swedes transform financial saving into annuities
purchased at a more advanced age, 75–80, to provide for older, old age.
Statistics Sweden data indicate that only around 2 percent of persons aged
65 or older claim a deduction for premium payments for private pension or
life insurance. Instead, this population relies almost exclusively on pay-
ments from the mandatory public scheme for income support. Indirectly,
the evidence that most utilize their private insurance before reaching the
age of 75 suggests a reliance on the public sector to provide sufficient
health and home care in the terminal years of life.
There are two reasons to believe that future coverage will not be consid-
ered sufficient, despite the public sector pension in Sweden. The first
reason is that coverage is already less than what many people would desire.
Public assistance in home care is more or less at a minimum guarantee level
for the elderly who want to remain at home, and it is likely to be even less in
the future. For those who need it, institutional care is provided but even
this care has a basic minimum guarantee character, with little room for
individual choice. Second, there is a clear trend toward increasing relative
affluence among a large segment of the pensioner population (Gustafsson
et al. 2009). This suggests that there is a growing segment of the elderly that
could afford long-term care (LTC) insurance if it were to be provided.
Indeed, individuals could save on their own to meet ‘extra’ LTC needs, but
in principle, it would be most efficient to purchase insurance.
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For Swedes, one of the uncertainties is the extent to which the public
commitment will develop in the future. Other more general unknowns, as
outlined for example in Mitchell et al. (2006), are both future develop-
ments in health and service technology, and the length of time people can
expect to be frail. As these authors point out, one of the deterrents to
providing LTC insurance is the possibility of adverse selection. Of course, if
prudent actuaries suspect adverse selection, they may price an insurance of
this kind unfavorably, further reducing demand. This is a frequently cited
reason for mandating insurance. A mandate would, however, also have to
have a ceiling, which given the sheer scope of aging must be low. For a
market to develop, it is important that the extent of the public commit-
ment be made clear. This seems to be the present challenge for policy.
It would also seem reasonable to create legislation that enables indivi-
duals to freely combine their balances from the three separate sources of
pension saving they presently have – their mandatory FDC account, the
‘quasi-mandatory’ occupational account, and their private voluntary ac-
count – to purchase one or more insurance products with potentially
different features. These features could be as simple as a life annuity,
combining two or three of these balances, a deferred annuity, or a combi-
nation. Our evidence indicates a potential demand for such products in the
not-too-distant future. Ultimately, whether demand does emerge must
depend on the ability of the market to offer saleable products on the
scale necessary to create viable risk pools (Mitchell and McCarthy 2004).
Conclusion
This chapter has analyzed the structure of demand for retirement products
in Sweden. While there is no good database with information on products
chosen by whom, we rely on a longitudinal income database from Statistics
Sweden for about 103,000 persons who claimed their benefits first in 1992.
Choosing this early date made it possible to follow individuals for fifteen
years, through 2007, the last year for which data were available. Our multi-
nomial Logit model helps identify which individuals elected shorter or
longer withdrawals of their private voluntary pension accounts, focusing on
the five-year benefit (the minimum possible withdrawal time in Sweden), a
withdrawal of more than five years but less than life, and a life annuity. We
find that most workers, except for white-collar workers, are more likely to
choose the five-year withdrawal, as are women and the least-educated.
Nevertheless, the pattern of usage of private insurance could already be in
the process of changing, since deductions for premium payments to private
insurance have been high for two decades leading up to 2010. This sets the
stage for a structural change, though there is no indication yet that this has
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occurred. It is also important to recognize that the future ability of the public
sector to pay for LTC is unknown. Currently, the average individual tends not
to buy insurance to cover this risk, without knowing more about the future
limit ofpublic coverageandhow the coveragewill befinanced. In fact, if future
coverage were to be based on ability to pay, as it is today, it might be inefficient
for people to save to cover this contingency. Accordingly, the present state of
uncertainty is unlikely to drive a large demand for and accommodating supply
of annuity products for the oldest old phase of the life cycle.
Notes
1 Individuals working at places of employment covered by one of the major em-
ployer–labor agreements are automatically covered by the agreement, regardless
of whether they are affiliated to the union covering their specific occupation.
2 In fact, studies of the effect of the introduction of the universal earnings-related
public scheme in 1960 indicated that the personal saving rate during the period
1960–80 would have been four percentage points higher on average in the
absence of this public scheme (Markowski and Palmer 1979; Palmer 1981; Berg
1983). This is evidence that the promise of a public pension in the future
contributed significantly to crowding out private saving for some time.
3 Financial assets exclude individuals’ assets in occupational plans and the manda-
tory premium pension scheme, as well as shares in the value of apartments owned
by individuals, all of which are counted as household financial assets in the
national accounts. The source for this data is Statistics Sweden (2009).
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